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Abstract—In the network neutrality debate, content
providers fight against side payments imposed by Internet
Service Providers, arguing that it could slow down innovation.
But at the same time some big providers actually pay those fees
while still officially in favor of neutrality. To better understand
this strategical behavior, this paper proposes a simple model
providing some insight on whether or not paying side payments
for an incumbent provider is a way to create barriers to entry
for competitors. It also investigates the economic consequences
on all actors: incumbent and new entrant content providers,
users, and the Internet Service Provider. We then describe how
the side payment can be determined as a Nash bargaining
solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
The network neutrality debate is shaking up not only
the telecommunication world but also countries governments
with laws passed worldwide. This vivid debate comes from
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) complaining about some
distant but heavy resource-consuming Content Providers
(CPs) creating stress on their network while not paying
anything to them because connected to the Internet through
another ISP. They therefore threat to block or slow down
their traffic if they do not pay a side fee in order to participate
in the network infrastructure maintenance and upgrade. This
created a lot of protests from user associations and content
providers claiming that it could harm innovation, freedom of
speech, and the universality of access principle among other
issues. The issue is therefore basically whether the network
should forbid differentiation or not. For more information
about the history of the network neutrality debate, and
arguments from both sides, the reader is advised to go to
[1]–[4] among the numerous publications on the topic.
Surprisingly, some big CPs, while officially strongly in
favor of neutrality, are now giving side payments to ISPs.
This is typically what Google (a major CP because of
YouTube traffic) is doing, for instance in France with the
main ISP Orange1, Netflix with Comcast and Verizon2, etc.
A question is then: what reason drives big CPs to accept
such side payments, when governments and user associations
seem to fight on their side? In this paper, we investigate
1http://www.theverge.com/2013/1/19/3894182/french-isp-orange-says-google-pays- to-send-traffic
2http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/05/21/see-which-isps-google-microsoft-and-netflix-trade-
internet-traffic-with/
the relevance of a potential reason: accepting side payments
when able to pay them could create a barrier to entry
for potential competitors. Indeed, new entrants may incur
initial costs and not have the same economies of scale than
incumbents; therefore they may not be able to afford such
payments. On the other hand, the cost of side payments for
incumbent providers may be overcome by the potential loss
due to competitors entering the market.
Barrier to entry definition has been a topic of discussion
in the economic literature. It has first been defined by Bain
in 1956 as “anything that allows incumbent firms to earn
above-normal profits without the treat of entry" [5]. Other
definitions followed. A historical development of definitions
and a classification was provided in [6] with four different
concepts of barrier to entry: ii) an economic barrier to entry
as a cost incurred by a new entrant but not by an incumbent,
ii) an antitrust barrier to entry as a cost delaying entry and
as a consequence reducing social welfare compared to an
immediate cost, iii) a primary barrier to entry as a cost that
constitutes a barrier to entry on its own, and iv) an ancillary
barrier to entry as a cost that (indirectly) reinforces other
barriers to entry. A side payment falls into the third category
(primary barrier to entry) since directly incurred by CPs
and potentially preventing market entrance if benefits are
not sufficient.
We propose in this paper to introduce and analyze a model
describing a simple Internet supply chain with two content
providers, end users, and ISPs as intermediaries. Demand
from users will be assumed to depend on the access price
at the ISP, and to follow a (traditional) linear form. We will
analyze several scenarios:
• without side payment (a neutral network) and with
competition between ISPs,
• with side payments and competition,
• and with side payments and only the incumbent CP.
We will compare the outputs obtained in theses scenarios.
We will particularly look at revenues of CPs and the ISP,
and consumer surplus. The goal is to get some insight about
what strategy each actors should choose and whether or
not some regulation rules should be imposed. If collusion
between the incumbent CP and the ISP is beneficial, we will
determine the side payment as a Nash bargaining solution
[7], an axiomatic concept describing a solution of negotiation
between players.
Note that modeling and analysis of barrier to entry in
markets has of course been already studied, in a spirit
somewhat similar to our work. A. Dixit in his seminal work
[8] considers also a direct competition between an incumbent
and an entrant providers, with linear demand too, but using
a model less representative of the Internet without ISPs as
intermediaries, whereas ISPs make here important decisions.
[9] is another work making use of a basic model, but working
on a different issue: determining the optimal number of firms
in a market depending on fixed costs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the mathematical model is presented, as well as the order of
decision among players, those playing first strategically an-
ticipating the subsequent decisions of the others. Section III
then provides the resulting values of revenues and consumer
surplus in the three scenarios: no side payment, side pay-
ment but only the incumbent CP, and side payments with
the two CPs. Those outputs are compared and conditions
under which creating barriers to entry are beneficial for the
incumbent provider are provided. Section IV then describes
how the incumbent CP and the ISP can negotiate the price,
defined as the Nash bargaining solution. Finally Section V
concludes our paper and discusses extensions of the model.
II. MODEL
We consider the model presented in Figure 1. It describes
a supply chain made of two content providers (CPs) in
competition, end users, and one ISP as an intermediary.
We just consider two CPs, believing that it is to provide
some insight (which is the goal of the paper), but this can
be generalized and will be the purpose of future work.
To simplify the analysis, users are treated as a continuum,
meaning that no user has individually an impact on the
system (i.e., they are assumed infinitesimal). The total mass
of base users is defined as D.
Figure 1 also shows the economic relations between
actors: there is potentially a cost c (side payment) per unit
of volume that CPs transfer to the ISP, and a subscription
fee p per unit of customer paid by customers to the ISP.
We also assumer a revenue ri (respectively re) per unit of
customer for the incumbent CP (respectively the entrant CP).
Those revenues may for instance be due to advertisements
displayed on the CP site and seen or clicked by customers,
but could apply to other types of revenue (sales, subscrip-
tions, etc.).
A. Users
Demand (mass of users) d is assumed to be linear in price,
d = (D − αp)+
Incumbent CP Entrant CP
ISP
No ISP
Set of end users
c c
p
Figure 1. Representation of relations between users, ISP and CPs
where α is the price sensitivity parameter and (·)+ =
max(·, 0). This type of model is traditional in economics
[7] and has often been used in models studying barriers to
entry such as [8].
We also decompose the total demand d into di, the mass
of users making use of the service of the incumbent and de
the mass of users making use of the new entrant service. In
the case where the incumbent is alone, we have di = d and
de = 0. On the other hand when both propose their services,
di = γid and de = γed with γi, γe ∈ (0, 1]. We will assume
γi + γe ≥ 1, meaning that users might use both services
(there is no exclusivity) when they are both present.
Note here that demand does not depend on content, more
exactly on whether or nor the two CPs are present or
not. This can be justified by the fact that the CPs we are
considering are just a part of the Internet content and having
one or two substitutable CPs does not limit users range of
activities (or has a negligible impact).
A metric of interest as a measure of consumer satisfaction
from the users’ side is Consumer Surplus (CS). Recall the
definition of (aggregated) CS: it is the aggregated difference
between the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay
and the actual paid price. Mathematically, it is the hashed
area in Figure 2.
B. Internet Service Provider
The ISP s characterized by its revenue
R = pd+ cvi + cve
where
• vi and ve are the corresponding units of volume with
vi = βidi and ve = βede
p
0
1
2
d = D − αp
de
m
an
d
d
Figure 2. Consumer surplus with a linear demand.
with βi and βe the (average) units of volume consumed
per user;
• pd corresponds to the revenue due to subscriptions from
users.
C. Content Providers
Recall that we have defined di and de as the masses of
users of the incumbent and new entrant CPs respectively,
and ri and re the respective revenues generated per (mass
unit of) customer.
The revenues of CPs are then:
Ri = ridi − cvi = (ri − βic)di
Re = (re − βec)de.
D. Order of decisions
CPs, ISP and users have to take strategical decisions, but
they are not all taken at the same time scale. The decisions
are as follows:
1) First, the ISP and incumbent CP decide (through a
negotiation) the side payment;
2) Then the ISP decides the subscription price p;
3) Finally users adapt their demand to the proposed ser-
vices and price.
Decisions are taken strategically, by backward induction:
even when playing first, actors will make their decision
anticipating what will be the subsequent decisions of the
others.
This model is studied in the next section in the case of
three scenarios:
1) no side payments and both CPs in the market;
2) side payments and only the incumbent provider;
3) side payments and both CPs.
The interest of considering those three scenarios, and com-
paring them, is many folds: First, it will help the incumbent
provider to decide whether or not to be in favor of side
payments and their level of magnitude, by comparing the
revenues to the cases where the new entrant is there. Second,
it helps the ISP to decide a strategy on side payments
by looking at its revenue, and also if negotiating with the
incumbent is beneficial as opposed to the threat of network
neutrality regulation. Finally, the same comparison is helpful
for regulatory bodies to investigate if it harms competition
and consumer surplus.
Note that in all cases, the subscription price is chosen to
maximize the ISP revenue
R = pd+ (cβiγi + cβeγe)d,
where we set γe = 0 and γi = 1 if the incumbent is alone.
To simplify the notations, define C = c(βiγi+ βeγe) as the
average side payment per (unit of) user. From R = (p +
C)(D − αp), we get
p =
D
2α
− C
2
as the price maximizing the ISP revenue.
Remark that this price could be negative if C > D/α
but this would mean a demand larger than the base D (in
the expression of demand, we should have set D as a max).
Taking p = 0 is then optimal.
III. OUTPUTS FOR GIVEN SIDE PAYMENTS
This section describes the outputs for the three scenarios
and then deduces the strategic decisions of players.
A. Without side payments
It amounts to assume c = 0.
Replacing this value of c in the price optimization and
substituting the optimal price and corresponding demand
value in the expressions of revenues and CS, we get
p =
D
2α
d =
D
2
Ri = riγi
D
2
Re = reγe
D
2
R =
D2
4α
CS =
∫ D
α
D
2α
(D − αp)dp = D
2
8α
.
Recall that the expression of CS is the hashed area in
Figure 2.
B. With side payments but only the incumbent content
provider
Then γi = 1, γe = 0, and C = cβi. For a given side
payment c, we get, following the same substitution procedure
than in previous subsection,
p =
D
2α
− cβi
2
(assumed non-negative)
d = di =
D
2
+ α
cβi
2
Ri = (ri − βic)
(
D
2
+ α
cβi
2
)
R =
1
4α
(D + αcβi)
2
CS =
∫ D
α
D
2α−
cβi
2
(D − αp)dp
=
D2 + 2Dcβiα+ c
2β2i α
2
8α
.
C. With side payments and the two content providers
It gives in this case
p =
D
2α
− c(βiγi + βeγe)
2
d =
D
2
+ α
c(βiγi + βeγe)
2
Ri = γi(ri − cβi)
(
D
2
+ α
c(βiγi + βeγe)
2
)
Re = γe(re − cβe)
(
D
2
+ α
c(βiγi + βeγe)
2
)
R =
1
4α
(D + αc(βiγi + βeγe))
2
CS =
D2 + 2Dc(βiγi + βeγe)α+ c(βiγi + βeγe)
2α2
8α
.
D. Comparison and resulting strategic decisions
We can make several remarks when comparing the outputs
for the three scenarios:
1) First, the new entrant will not enter the market if its
revenue is negative, i.e., if c > re/βe. The incumbent
CP, if wishing to prevent the new entrant to reach
customers, must agree on side payments of at least that
amount. Clearly also, the incumbent cannot accept a
non-negative revenue, hence we must have c ≤ ri/βi. It
implicitly means that the revenue per unit of data ri/βi
has to be larger for the incumbent than that re/βe of
the new entrant. This will be assumed from now and is
a reasonable assumption.
2) But in order for the incumbent to be in favor of side
payments, and therefore to create barrier to entry, its
revenue has also to be larger than i) when the new
entrant is there (with side payments), and ii) when there
is no side payments.
• First, the situation when it is beneficial to pay c for
the incumbent to and be alone in the market rather
than paying and being in competition with the same
c is summarized by the equation (comparing the
respective expressions of Ri):
D + αcβi > γi (D + αc(βiγi + βeγe)) .
Note that for γi small enough, this will always be
true (that is, the new entrant make the incumbent
lose too many clients; it is better to pay enough side
payments to avoid its presence). But what amount
c of payment is required to be in favor of side
payments? The above equation is equivalent to
(1− γi)D
α
> c(γi(βiγi + βeγe)− βi).
– If γi(βiγi+ βeγe)− βi ≤ 0, this will always be
true;
– If γi(βiγi+ βeγe)− βi > 0, we need c < ((1−
γi)
D
α )/(γi(βiγi + βeγe)− βi).
• In addition, being in monopoly with side payments
has to be preferred to the (neutral) competitive case
without fee. The former situation is preferred to the
latter if (ri− βic)(D+αcβi) > riγiD, i.e., if c is
in the interval−(D − αri)−
√
β2i (D − αri)2 + 4αβ2i ri(1− γi)D
2αβ2i
,
−(D − αri) +
√
β2i (D − αri)2 + 4αβ2i ri(1− γi)D
2αβ2i
 .
The left bound of the interval being negative, we
actually just need c to be smaller than the right
bound.
Compiling those two results, the incumbent CP will
clearly prefer paying the ISP for its traffic and create
barriers to entry if
c < min
(
((1− γi)
D
α
)/(γi(βiγi + βeγe)− βi),
−(D − αri) +
√
β2i (D − αri)2 + 4αβ2i ri(1− γi)D
2αβ2i

if γi(βiγi + βeγe)− βi > 0, and just if
c <
−(D − αri) +
√
β2i (D − αri)2 + 4αβ2i ri(1− γi)D
2αβ2i
if γi(βiγi + βeγe)− βi ≤ 0.
Remark that the incumbent can at the same time pay
a level of fee to ensure that the new entrant will not
be there and ask for no side payments publicly. This
is typically what would happen if the revenue with
side payment and barrier to entry is i) larger than that
with the new entrant (and still a side payment), but ii)
smaller than that with a “neutral" ISP. It corresponds
to the situation when the CP would prefer the neutral
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Figure 3. Revenues in terms of c.
behavior, but being unsure that it will be applied, goes
to the best of two evils. It may also be strategical even
if monopoly plus side payments is the best option, in
terms of image and in order to better negotiate the level
of payments (see next section). It may explain what
Google is doing in France: paying a side payment to the
major ISP (Orange), but asking for a neutral network.
3) The ISP has also to agree that the level of side payment
increases its revenue R. This is always the case with
respect to a neutral situation. But a single CP will
be preferred if csβi > c2(βiγi + βeγe) where cs is
the side payment when there is only one CP (through
a corresponding negotiation, and c2 when there are
two. If cs = c2, we just need βi > βiγi + βeγe.
But this inequality is true if the incumbent induces a
large amount of traffic (typically what Google does with
YouTube).
4) Consider now consumer surplus. If a regulator inves-
tigates the consequences of side payments, they are
actually beneficial from a customer point of view. This
comes from the fact that due to side payments, the
ISP can reduce the access price, hence higher levels of
demand and satisfaction from end users. This situation
is actually at the expense of CPs instead and only.
Example 1. Figure 3 displays the revenues in terms of c
when D = 10, α = 1, βi = 0.7, βe = 2, ri = 6, re = 3,
γi = 0.7, and γe = 0.5 (arbitrary values). We display the
revenues Ri and R in the competitive case when c < re/βe,
and in the monopolistic case when re/βe ≤ c < ri/βi. We
clearly see the threshold at re/βe = 1.5 where the new CP
strategy changes from entering the market to not entering it.
We also see that the incumbent CP is better off with a side
payment when above but close to that threshold.
Table I presents some numerical computations for the
three scenarios, for two values of c. If the price is c = 0.5,
the incumbent CP even gets a higher revenue than in the
two other cases when alone, but with such a c, the new
entrant would be present; we would be in the situation of
side payment and competition. On the other hand, we see
that with a price c = 2 the new entrant should not enter
the market, and the incumbent gets a higher revenue than
without side payment or with a side payment smaller than
re/βe = 1.5 (something clear on Figure 3). The revenue of
the ISP is also higher than when no side payment, hence
is better solution for both the ISP and incumbent CP, and
therefore an incentive to cooperate. In terms of consumer
surplus, the higher the side payment, the better it is.
IV. SIDE PAYMENTS NEGOTIATION
In the previous section, we were discussing the optimal
strategies when the side payment was fixed. The purpose
of this section is to investigate how those payments can
be defined, if they are eventually authorized by regulators.
Actually several possibilities exist. A first one would be that
the price is chosen by the ISP trying to maximize its revenue.
It is clear from the revenue expressions that it would be set
at a level such that the CP revenue is becoming 0, at the
same time increasing demand because most ISP revenue is
then paid by the CP. In such a case, there would a strong
opposition and lobbying from CPs, and the risk of neutrality
regulation would be very large.
We consider here the situation where there is a negotiation
between the incumbent CP and the ISP about the side
payment. The solution of this negotiation is assumed to be
the result of an axiomatic model called Nash bargaining
solution [10]. Placed into our context, the ISP and incumbent
CP independently choose a set of acceptable side payments,
the ones providing a non-negative revenue in the interval
(re/βe, ri/βi) ensuring for the incumbent to impose barriers
to entry. If there is no agreement, a threat is executed: due to
eventual complains related to the network neutrality debate,
the threat is no side payment, c = 0. Since this negotiation
may end up with several equilibria, the most likely to be
played is the one maximizing the product of the utilities
minus the utility at the threat [11]. In other words, that
equilibrium side payment c maximizes
K = (Ri(c)−Ri(0))(R(c)−R(0)),
where Ri(c) and R(c) are the revenues with side payment c,
and that maximizer is called the Nash bargaining solution.
Since c > re/βe, only the incumbent CP is present and
K =
(
(ri − βic)
(
D
2
+ α
cβi
2
)
− riγiD
2
)
cβi
4
(cαβi + 2D) .
We can differentiate this term with respect to c and get op-
timum values (that will be summarized to solving polynoms
in c of degree three). Instead of providing this analytic list
which does not bring much insight, we illustrate on our
running example the Nash bargaining solution for c.
Example 2. Figure 4 displays K in terms of c (still when
D = 10, α = 1, βi = 0.7, βe = 2, ri = 6, re = 3, γi = 0.7,
c Scenario p d Ri Re R CS
— No side payment 5 5 21 7.5 25 12.5
0.5 Monopoly 4.825 5.175 29.23875 — 26.780625 13.3903125
0.5 Side payment and competition 4.6275 5.3725 21.2482375 5.3725 28.86375625 14.43187812
2 Monopoly 4.3 5.7 26.22 — 32.49 16.245
2 Side payment and competition 3.51 6.49 20.8978 -3.245 42.1201 21.06005
Table I
SOME NUMERICAL VALUES FOR THE THREE SCENARIOS FOR TWO VALUES OF c
c Scenario p d Ri Re R CS
2.137012 Nash Bargaining 4.2520458 5.7479542 25.88931223 — 33.03897748 16.51948874
Table II
NUMERICAL VALUES FOR c AS THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION.
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30
35
40
c
K
Figure 4. K in terms of c.
and γe = 0.5). One can check that, with our parameters, K
is maximized at c = 2.137012. Table II presents the output
at this value. The incumbent CP revenue is not maximized
(because smaller than when c = 2), but much larger than
when there is no side payment. The same applies for the ISP.
It is indeed a compromise on which they both agree.
We also display in Figure 5 Nash bargaining c in terms
of βi when the other parameters are defined as above. This
side payment c is larger than the threshold re/βe = 1.5 for
“small" values of βi, and sticks to that threshold as soon as
βi ≥ 1.0.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a simple model repre-
senting the Internet supply chain and analyzed the relevance
for incumbent CPs to agree to pay side payments (depending
on parameter values) to ISPs in order to introduce barrier to
entry for competitors. This helps to understand the current
behavior of some big CPs, paying those fees despite mili-
tating against non-neutral networks. We believe that even if
simple, the presented model provides some insight on the
consequence on all categories of actors.
In terms of future work, one assumption we would like
0 1 2 3 4
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Figure 5. Nash bargaining c in terms of βi.
to relax is the known parameter values for the new entrant.
Indeed, it is not easy to determine before negotiating the
side payment what would be the new entrant provider’s
revenue, market share, etc. We would like to replace those
deterministic values by known distributions (or beliefs based
on experience) and then try to maximize expected revenues.
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